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Applying this test to Lucas's case, 
the Court found it unlikely that com-
mon-law principles would have pre-
vented Lucas from building on his 
land, but left judgment on the issue to 
the South Carolina Supreme Court on 
remand. Id TheSouthCaroIinaCoastal 
Council's burden on remand, the Court 
noted, is to "identify background prin-
ciples of nuisance and property law 
that prohibit the uses [Lucas] now in-
tends in the circumstances in which the 
property is presently found." Id at 
2901-02. Only by sustaining this bur-
den could the State contend that the 
Beachfront Management Act's pro-
scription of all such beneficial uses did 
not amount to a taking. Id. at 2902. 
With the development of a new test 
for regulatory takings in Lucas, the 
Supreme Court did not wholly reject 
its earlier analyses of public nuisances, 
legitimate state interests, or economi-
cally viable uses of private land. Rather, 
the Lucas test mandates an antecedent 
examination of state property and nui-
sance law to determine whether regu-
lations on land use effect a taking re-
quiring compensation of the landowner. 
Lower courts may have difficulty 
implementing the Lucas test, however, 
because the Court outlined the test in 
broad terms and did not provide spe-
cific guidelines. Consequently, poten-
tialland purchasers must exercise cau-
tion and determine if property is sub-
ject to implied limitations on its use. 
- Joshua D. Bruch 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
Schools: DAMAGES ARE AV AIL-
ABLE FOR AN ACTION 
BROUGHT TO ENFORCE TITLE 
IX OF THE EDUCATION 
AMENDMENTS OF 1972. 
In a recent unanimous decision, the 
United States Supreme Court held that 
federal courts have the authority to 
award appropriate remedies in actions 
brought pursuant to Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 (Title 
IX). Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. 
Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). In so 
holding, the Court maintained the gen-
eral principle that absent a clear indica-
tion by Congress to the contrary, fed-
eral courts have the power to award 
appropriate relief in cases brought un-
der a federal statute. 
Petitioner, Christine Franklin, was 
a student at North Gwinnett High 
School in Georgia. Respondent, 
Gwinnett County School District, op-
erated the school with federal funds. 
On December 29, 1988, Franklin filed 
a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia, alleging that she had been a 
victim of sexual harassment and abuse 
by a teacher, Andrew Hill. She sought 
damages pursuant to Title IX, which 
provides in part that "[ n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be 
denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance." Id. at 1031 n.l 
(quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988». 
Subsequent to Franklin filing the com-
plaint, Hill resigned from his position 
at North Gwinnett High School on the 
condition that all pending matters and 
investigations be dropped. The school 
closed its investigation. 
The district court dismissed 
Franklin's complaint, holding that Title 
IX does not provide for an award of 
damages. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed. Noting that Title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 and 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
have been interpreted similarly, the 
appellate court relied on Drayden v. 
Needville Indep. Sck Dist., 642 F.2d 
129 (5th Cir. 1981), which held that the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not pro-
vide for an award of damages, as its 
authority for not granting damages 
under Title IX. The court further rea-
soned that damages were limited under 
statutes that were enacted pursuant to 
Congress's Spending Clause power. 
Because Title IX was enacted under 
the spending clause without an express 
provision for damages, the court held 
that damages were unavailable. The 
United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to settle the conflicting deci-
sions among the circuit courts on the 
issue of whether the implied right of 
action underTitie IX authorizes a claim 
for damages. 
In an opinion delivered by Justice 
White, the Supreme Court first ac-
knowledged the general rule that 
''where legal rights have been invaded 
and a federal statute provides for a 
general right to sue for such invasion, 
federal courts may use any available 
remedy to make good the wrong done." 
Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1033 (quoting 
Bel/v. Hood, 327U.S. 678, 684(1946». 
The Court also recognized that afford-
ing a remedy for wrongs was deeply 
rooted in American history and in sup-
port thereof quoted Chief Justice 
Marshall's declaration that our gov-
emment"bas been emphatically termed 
a government oflaws, and not of men. 
It will certainly cease to deserve this 
high appellation, if the laws furnish no 
remedy for the violation of a vested 
legal right." Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 
1033 (quoting Marbury v. Madison,S 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1908». 
In arguing that damages should not 
be provided under Title IX, Respon-
dents and the United States as amicus 
curiae insisted that the presumption in 
favor of damages no longer existed aDd 
emphasized that both the statute and 
the legislative intent behind the statute 
were silent as to damages. Franklin, 
112 S. Ct. at 1034. Respondents con-
tended that regardless ofthe presump-
tion that existed traditionally or at the 
time Bell was decided, Davis v. 
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) nulli-
fied the presumption by holding that 
''the question of who may enforce a 
statutory right is fundamentally differ-
ent from the question of who may 
enforce a right that is protected by the 
Constitution." Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 
1 034 (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 241). 
In rejecting this contention, the Court 
held that Davis dealt with whether one 
had a cause of action, not with whether 
one was entitled to any relief under a 
particular cause of action. Franklin, 
___ 23.1 I The Law For u m 21 
112 S. Ct. at 1034. The latter, said the 
Court, was an entirely different ques-
tion, and therefore Davis did not alter 
the status of the presumption. Id. 
Respondents further argued that 
GuardiansAss 'nv. CivilServ. Comm 'n 
of New York City, 463 U.S.582 (1983), 
and Consolidated Rail Corp. v. 
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), eroded 
the traditional presumption of relief. 
Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035. While 
acknowledging that the various opin-
ions in Guardians made it difficult to 
decipher the majority holding, the Court 
determined that the majority held that 
damages were available for an inten-
tional violation of a statute similar to 
Title IX. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035. 
InDarrone, a unanimous court awarded 
backpay for another similar statute. Id. 
Thus, these cases, reasoned the Court, 
actually supported the presumption in 
favor of awarding damages. Id. 
The Court then addressed Respon-
dents' contention that Congress was 
silent with regard to damages in both 
the text and the legislative history of 
the statute. The Court noted that be-
cause Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), held that 
Title IX did not provide for an express 
right of action, it was not surprising 
that the statute was silent regarding 
remedies. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035. 
The Court asserted that it was neces-
sary to look to the state of the law when 
Congress passed Title IX to determine 
whether remedies were available. Id. 
at 1036. In so doing, the Court held 
that the traditional presumption in fa-
vor of remedies existed at the time 
Title IX was enacted, and that neither 
subsequent case law nor statutes had 
altered the presumption. Id. Damages, 
therefore, were available for an action 
brought pursuant to Title IX. Id. at 
1036-37. 
The Respondents also argued that 
an award of damages would violate the 
doctrine of separation of powers, that 
the presumption in favor of damages 
did not apply when Congress enacts a 
statute pursuant to its Spending Clause 
power, and that if damages were avail-
able, they should be limited to backpay 
and prospective relief. Id. at 1037. In 
rejecting the argument that a damages 
award would violate the doctrine of 
separation of powers, the Court as-
serted that the discretion to award re-
lief did not increase judicial power or 
impinge on areas that were reserved to 
the executive and legislative branches. 
Id. The doctrine of separation of pow-
ers would actually be hanned if courts 
were permitted to decide against award-
ing damages, as such adjudication 
would frustrate and make useless causes 
of action authorized by Congress. Id. 
Continuing its analysis, the Court 
rejected the argument that the tradi-
tional presumption should not apply to 
statutes enacted pursuant to Congress's 
Spending Clause power. Id. The Court 
observed that in Pennhurst State Sch. 
and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I 
(1981), remedies were limited under 
the Spending Clause power when the 
violation involved was unintentional 
because there was no notice of liabil-
ity. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1037. The 
Court distinguished the instant case by 
concluding that the problem of notice 
was not implicated when the violation 
involved was intentional. Id. 
The Court also declined to limit the 
remedy under the statute to backpay 
and prospective relief, because they 
were inappropriate and insufficient. Id. 
at 1038. The remedy of back pay was 
useless here because Ms. Franklin was 
a student at the time of the violation, 
and prospective relief was insufficient 
because Ms. Franklin no longer at-
tended public school and Hill no longer 
taught at the school. Id. In addition, 
such limitations abandoned the tradi-
tional approach of allowing courts to 
decide the extent of remedies when a 
federal right has been violated. Id. 
By holding that damages were avail-
able to enforce an action pursuant to 
Title IX, the Franklin court empha-
sized the importance of providing rem-
edies for wrongs committed in viola-
tion offederal statutes. Because of the 
diversity on the Supreme Court, unani-
mous decisions are rare. Thus, on the 
heels of Justice Thomas's nomination 
hearings and the publicity and aware-
ness that the proceeding brought to the 
issue of sexual harassment, it appears 
that the issue of sexual harassment 
may have been a significant factor in 
the Court's decision. Nevertheless, to 
rule otherwise would have left Ms. 
Franklin and others similarly situated 
without any practical recourse under 
the law. While this decision will most 
likely increase the amount of sexual 
harassment cases litigated, hopefully it 
will serve as a deterrent as well. 
- Cheryl Zak 
Hafer v. Melo: STATE OFFICERS, 
EVEN WHEN ACTING IN THEIR 
OFFICIAL CAPACITY, MAY BE 
PERSONALL Y LIABLE FOR 
DEPRIVA TION OF CITIZENS' 
FEDERAL RIGHTS. 
In Hafer v. Me/o, 112 S. C1. 358 
(J 991), the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that under title 42, section 
1983 of the United States Code, state 
officials may be held personally liable 
when performing functions within their 
official capacity. The Court found that 
this issue differed with a suit against an 
actual state office. In that case, be-
cause the state itself is the real party in 
interest, the action is futile since states 
are immune from civil actions for mon-
etary damages. If, however, state of-
ficers are sued personally for their ac-
tions in office, the party in interest is 
the named person and the state's im-
munities do not apply. 
In 1989, Barbara Hafer ran for the 
position of Auditor General of Penn-
sylvania. While campaigning, it was 
alleged that Hafer was given a list of 
twenty-one employees in the Auditor 
General's office who had secured their 
jobs through payments to a fonner 
employee. Hafer had promised to fire 
the people on the list ifshe was elected. 
After winning the election, Hafer fired 
eighteen people on the list, including 
James Melo, Jr., on the grounds that 
they had "bought" their jobs. 
Melo and seven others filed suit 
against Hafer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
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